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Abstract
We analyze a model of electoral competition based on the issue-ownership theory of campaigns.
In the model, parties invest resources to manipulate the salience of various issues, and the
salience of an issue is the probability a voter casts her ballot according to her party preferences
on that issue. Parties use campaigns to prime voters to think about diﬀerent issues. Our
results uncover Riker’s “dominance principle” and suggest that parties will generally campaign
on one issue. The two-dimensional version of the model demonstrates that parties talk past
each other and indicates that competition will be most fierce when parties are similarly eﬀective
campaigners and the issues are not naturally salient. With more than two parties, there is a
potential for free-riding on the campaigns of parties who are the most eﬀective.
⇤Thanks to Chit Basu, Rob Carroll, John Duggan, Patrick Egan, Tasos Kalandrakis, Mattan Sharkansky, Jennifer
Smith, Yannis Vassiliadis, and participants at the Midwest Political Science Association’s 2014 Annual Conference
for valuable feedback and discussions. We are responsible for all remaining errors.
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1 Introduction
The skills of political leaders who must maneuver for public
support in a democracy consist partly in knowing what issue
dimensions are salient to the electorate or can be made salient
by suitable propaganda.
Donald E. Stokes, 1963
One prominent explanation of electoral competition revolves around the idea that parties mobilize
voters by emphasizing policy issues rather than by adopting policy platforms on the same issues
(e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983a,b; Budge 1987; Budge et al. 2001; Petrocik 1996). Central to this view
are two theories of issue–based vote choice: the issue ownership theory and the issue salience theory.
According to the first, voters perceive one party to be the most competent to handle certain policy
areas. As Budge and Farlie put it, “electors make a clear connection between a certain party and good
government performance on a particular issue (. . . ) The result is that parties are widely perceived
as ‘owning’ certain issue types” (1983a, 25). Issue salience refers to the perceived importance of the
dimensions that define the political space. Proponents of this theory argue that “the issues which
influence political judgments are those an individual feels are important” (Rabinowitz, Prothro and
Jacoby 1982, 42). An immediate consequence of this observation in the realm of voting behavior
is that, “while campaigns are indeed multidimensional aﬀairs (. . . ) this does not mean that each
voter takes all, or even many, of these dimensions into account when voting” (Hammond and Humes
1993, 142). Taken together, these theories imply that voters cast their ballots for the owner of the
issue that is more salient at the time of the election; “once electors decide which issue is salient, the
question of which party to support generally follows automatically” (Budge and Farlie 1983b, 271).
Although issue ownership is usually conceptualized as fixed1 or, in Petrocik’s words, as a “critical
constant” (1996, 826), issue salience is thought to be susceptible to strategic manipulation (e.g. Stokes
1963; Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie 1983a; Hammond and Humes 1993; Petrocik 1996). In this
paper we examine the question of how parties decide what issues to emphasize, or make more salient,
during an electoral campaign. To do so, we present a model of electoral competition in which parties
manipulate the relative salience of issues by investing campaign resources. In addition, our setup
allows us to address other relevant puzzles related to this view of party competition: What is the
optimal number of issues a party should emphasize? How much will parties invest on each issues?
When will political parties emphasize the same issues? And how does a party’s ability to increase
the salience of an issue aﬀect the strategies of other parties?
The model has three key features. First, following the extant substantive literature, we assume
that voters have preferences over political parties for each policy issue and that they vote for the
party that owns the issue they perceive as most salient. In contrast with most formal works, we do
not endow voters with “spatial” preferences, such as Euclidean or quadratic preferences. Instead, we
assume voters’ choices to be guided by the “behavioral rule” of voting for the party they think is more
1For an exception to this approach see Meguid (2007).
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competent to handle what they consider to be the most important issue at the time of the election.
We believe that this assumption on voters’ behavior is more in line with the substantive literature on
issue ownership, which does not include party positioning in its formulation (e.g. Budge and Farlie
1983b). To illustrate what this assumption implies, consider a voter who thinks that the Democrats
are best able to cope with unemployment and that the Republicans are the most competent to deal
with national defense; if national defense is the most salient issue for this voter, then she would
vote Republican. This description of voters’ behavior is consistent with the observation that “issue
ownership should only aﬀect the decision of those voters who think that the issue in question is
important” (Bélanger and Meguid 2008, 479). More importantly, we let perceptions about both the
ownership and the salience of issues vary across the electorate. That is, we allow voters to disagree
about which party is best able to handle each policy dimension, and about what issue is the most
salient at the moment they cast their ballots. Again, this heterogeneity is compatible with the
empirical literature, which has shown that “there is rarely a clear-cut consensus about the ownership
of issues” (Bélanger and Meguid 2008, 482).
Second, we follow the extant literature in that we treat ownership as given and salience as
endogenous to electoral competition. This means that the parties’ campaign eﬀorts will aﬀect the
voters’ perceptions about what issues are important but not their beliefs regarding what party is
more competent to handle them. Scholars have identified diﬀerent reasons for the stability of issue
ownership, such as the parties’ records in oﬃce (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983b) and the structural
attributes of the constituencies they seek to attract (e.g. Petrocik 1996). By contrast, saliency is a
short–term phenomenon; the salience literature assume that voters can be persuaded that any issue
is salient. As Petrocik explains, “issue concerns change with existing national conditions, but non–
ideological, instrumental, and sociotropic voters are prepared to believe that almost any problem is
important and they are susceptible to priming and framing eﬀorts by the candidates” (1996, 830).
Although the focus of the model is on how parties can change the relative salience of issues, we
also deal with the fact that elections do not take place in a vacuum. Thus, we allow for issues to
have an exogenous or “natural” salience, which is intended to capture two realistic features of issue
competition. The first one has to do with the fact that certain issues – the economy, for example
– are, in general, more salient than others. The second one is the possibility that the electorate
might shift its attention to certain issues for reasons beyond the control of parties; for instance, the
salience of national security issues might increase after a terrorist attack.
Third and final, we examine a situation in which parties are endowed with resources, which
they can use to manipulate the relative saliency of issues. In the model, the salience of an issue
corresponds to the probability that a voter casts her ballot according to her preferences on that issue,
and its key feature is that increasing the salience of one issue decreases the salience of other issues.
In this context, parties essentially use campaigns to prime voters to care about diﬀerent issues.
We allow campaign expenditures to have heterogeneous eﬀects across both parties and issues. This
means two things. On the one hand, not all parties are equally capable of altering the salience of
the same issue. To illustrate this point, we could think that the Green Party is more eﬀective at
increasing the salience of environmental issues than the Conservative Party.2 On the other hand,
2While the reasons for this variation could be diverse, we could interpret it as the credibility of each party on
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the ability of a party to change the salience of policy dimensions varies across issues. That is, a
party can simultaneously be very successful at drawing attention to one issue but almost incapable
of shifting the salience of others – such is the case of niche parties, which are by definition single-issue
parties (Meguid 2007).
In the model, when parties decide how to spend their campaign resources, they care about two
important links between themselves and the possible issues: ownership and campaign eﬀectiveness.
In this framework, issue ownership refers to a voter’s belief concerning which party possesses the
best policy reputation on the issue or which party best solves problems associated with the issue.
Eﬀectiveness, in contrast, refers to the degree to which parties actually influence voters’ perceptions
about the relative importance of issues. Parties who are not eﬀective on an issue will need to spend
more resources to convince voters that the issue is important than parties who are eﬀective. Our
main results are driven by the interaction between ownership and eﬀectiveness.
Our results oﬀer confidence that the model captures important aspects of substantive theories of
issue ownership and, at the same time, provide avenues for future empirical and theoretical research.
In the more general case we consider, with an arbitrary number of parties competing along an
arbitrary number of dimensions, we find that a party will never campaign on its weakest issue and
will almost always invest its resources on one issue. In our view, when every party is generically
investing in at least one issue, then the number of parties can serve as an upper bound on the number
of issues that are emphasized during a campaign.
For the case of two parties competing over two issues, we find that parties “talk past each other,”
as they never invest on the same issue. Even though this finding is consistent with foundational
work on this area (Budge and Farlie 1983b; Petrocik 1996), the model uncovers some insights on
how parties decide what dimensions to emphasize. Whereas the conventional rationale for this result
is that a party’s calculus involves considering which party has the upper hand on each issue, our
model suggests – and this applies to the more general case too – that each party will make this
decision by considering what issue is more advantageous relative to other issues. To illustrate this
diﬀerence, consider the extreme case where voters are more likely to think the same single party
owns every issue. While a traditional interpretation of the theory would suggest that other parties
should remain silent, our model suggests that, even in this case, all parties have at least one issue
that is more profitable to emphasize relative to other issues.
In addition, we identify an inverse-U relationship between a party’s eﬀectiveness at increasing
the salience of the issue and its campaign spending. That is, a party with either small or high
levels of eﬀectiveness at increasing the salience of an issue will invest fewer resources than if it had
middle eﬀectiveness levels. Non-linearities also arise when we consider the eﬀects of a party’s eﬀorts
on other parties’ campaign strategies. In two party competition, where both parties emphasize
diﬀerent issues, we find that a party’s campaign spending in its favorable issue has an inverse-U
with both the competing party’s eﬀectiveness to increase the salience of the remaining issue and
with the other party’s cost of campaigning. In other words, electoral competition is most fierce
each issue; it has been noted, for example, that “the party that first comes up with a policy, say of creating a national
health service, which is widely accepted, is likely always to maintain greater credibility in this area than the opposing
party” (Robertson 1976, 67).
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when parties have similar, but not identical, campaign costs and eﬀectiveness.
Finally, we consider an example with three parties. We characterize an equilibrium in which
two parties invest in the same issue, which highlights potential free-riding problems in electoral
campaigns. The result indicates that when distinct parties both campaign on an issue, one party
exhausts all of its resources on the issue, and another party still finds it beneficial to increase the
issue’s salience after this initial investment. Substantively, this result provides another reason why
parties campaign on the same issue besides attempting to hurt the vote share of a rival (Meguid
2007) or to steal ownership (Holian 2004; Sides 2006).
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review the literature on issue
ownership as well as the formal works that are more closely related to ours. In Sections 3 and 4,
we present the model and describe general results of substantive interest, respectively. Section 5
then presents the main results for the two–party, two–issue case, and Section 6 shows an example of
three–party competition that illustrates the potential for free riding in electoral campaigns. Section
7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The notion that the emphasis of policy issues is at least as important as the adoption of policy stances
on particular issues for electoral competition can be traced to Stokes’ (1963) famous critique of the
Downsian (1957) framework. In it, Stokes makes a distinction between what he calls position issues,
which “involve advocacy of government actions from a set of alternatives over which a distribution
of voter preferences is defined,” and what he calls valence issues, which “merely involve the linking of
the parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate” (1963, 373).
One of his main criticisms is that the spatial model of party competition cannot accommodate valence
issues because, when dealing with this kind of policy dimension, party strategy is essentially about
choosing what dimensions of political evaluation should be emphasized; as he explains, “electoral
changes can result from changes in the coordinate system of the space rather than changes in the
distribution of parties and voters” (1963, 372).
In the same vein, Robertson (1976) introduces a “problem-solving” approach to electoral compe-
tition. In his view, voters are often incapable of technical appraisal of policy itself and instead must
rely on their evaluations about the competence of political parties, seen as alternative governments,
to solve the problems that require government action. This assumption on voters’ knowledge, he
argues, implies that party competition consists of identifying the problems that need to be solved
and oﬀering solutions for them; voters “cannot set the problems which are to be dealt with, but
must choose one alternative that represents both a list of problems and suggested solutions” (1976,
12). Furthermore, Robertson argues that over time parties will develop reputations regarding their
competence to handle certain policy dimensions so that diﬀerent issues will become advantageous
for certain parties.
Probably the most comprehensive formulation of this theory is that of Budge and Farlie (1983a;
1983b, see also Budge 1987; 2001). According to these authors, parties are endowed with issue
reputations; that is, voters distinguish parties in terms of their ability and competence to bring
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about desirable outcomes in specific policy areas. Therefore, political parties compete by selectively
emphasizing the issues that work for them and by ignoring the ones that are more advantageous
for others. As they put it, “To win votes therefore strategists do not argue much about policy
positions, which are taken as read, but emphasize the importance of those issues where the party is
ideologically committed and hence most trusted by electors” (1983a, 82). Petrocik’s (1996) theory
further elaborates on the sources of these diﬀerentiated issue reputations, or issue ownership, and
argues that these are a function of both the record of the incumbent and the constituencies of the
parties. As he explains, “party constituency ownership of an issue is much more long–term because its
foundation is (1) the relatively stable, but diﬀerent social bases, that distinguish party constituencies
(. . . ) and (2) the link between political conflict and social structure” (1996, 827). Since parties have
distinct bases of support, there is a strong connection between a party’s issue agenda and the social
characteristics of its constituency, and these factors reinforce each other election after election.
By and large, these works have concluded that, in the context of electoral campaigns, parties
will try to increase the salience of the issues they own and ignore the ones that are owned by other
parties. This proposition comes under diﬀerent names. Riker’s (1996) “dominance principle” states
that “when one side has an advantage on an issue, the other side ignores it” (106). Budge and
Farlie (1983a) refer to this as the “selective emphasis” of issues, so that “rather than promoting an
educational dialogue, parties talk past each other” (24). Similarly, according to Petrocik’s “issue
ownership” theory the goal of political parties in electoral campaigns is “to achieve a strategic
advantage by making problems which reflect owned issues (. . . ) the criteria by which voters make
their choice” (828).
Although this literature emerged and developed explicitly as an alternative to Downs’ (1957)
spatial model, it is surprising to see that most of the formal work on this area has proceeded by
merging the two approaches into one (e.g. Amorós and Puy 2010, 2013; Aragonès, Castanheira and
Giani 2012; Hammond and Humes 1993; Rozenas 2009; Simon 2002). In Simon (2002), Amorós
and Puy (2010, 2013), and Rozenas (2009), it is assumed that voters’ utility functions take the
form of quadratic distance between the voter’s ideal point and the candidates’ platform on the
issue. A common problem with this setup is the diﬃculty in determining the existence of pure
strategy equilibria. In Aragonès, Castanheira and Giani (2012), the utilities are linear and strictly
increasing in the candidates’ positions on the issue because the policy platforms are public goods
and the position reflects the quality of party’s policy addressing such issue. Roth (2011) investigates
a decision-theoretic model and discusses the possibility of free-riding in this context.
Our model is also related to a set of works that consider candidates with diﬀerent productivities
in distinct policy areas who compete by choosing the amount of resources to allocate on each di-
mension (e.g. Krasa and Polborn 2010; Hummel 2012; Pollack 2011), and, more generally, to models
in which players compete by spending resources on a number of simultaneous contests (e.g. Cox
and McCubbins 1986; Kvasov 2007; Kovenock and Roberson 2012). The main diﬀerence between
our model and the ones commonly found in this latter literature is our interpretation of an issue’s
salience. In the model below, salience is not the probability that a party wins or loses a specific
issue but rather the probability that a voter determines her vote choice according to her preferences
on that issue. Because of this, increasing the salience of one issue decreases the salience of all other
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issues, which leads to richer comparative statics and potential diﬃculties in applying oﬀ-the-shelf
existence arguments.
3 The Model
In this section, we present a model in which parties or candidates invest campaign resources across
issues to manipulate their salience. In the model, the salience of an issue corresponds to the prob-
ability that a voter votes according to her preferences on that issue, and its key feature is that
increasing one issue’s salience decreases the salience of all other issues. This framework incorporates
the ideas that every voter can be convinced that every issue is important and a voter’s political
preference on an issue matters in her vote choice only when the issue is salient or important to her.
There are J parties competing to win the votes of a unit mass of voters alongK issues. Hereafter,
we use j = 1, ..., J to index an arbitrary party and k = 1, ...,K to index the issues. Parties
simultaneously spend resources to influence the salience of each issue, which then influences the
parties’ vote shares; that is, candidates use campaigns to prime voters to care about certain issues
(Jacobs and Shapiro 1994; Druckman 2004; Bartels 2006). party j possesses Rj > 0 resources, which
can be allocated across the K issues, and j’s action set, denoted ⇤j , consists of all feasible allocations
of j’s resources. That is,
⇤j =
(
 j 2 [0, Rj ]K
      X
k
 k  Rj
)
Let ⇤ = ⇤1⇥ · · ·⇥⇤J denote the set of possible resource allocations for all parties. For any resource
allocation   the resulting salience of dimension k is given by the function s¯k : ⇤ [0, 1] where
s¯k( ) =
 k +
P
j  
j
k 
j
kP
k0
h
 k0 +
P
j  
j
k0 
j
k0
i , (1)
 jk > 0 is the relative eﬀectiveness of party j’s investment, and  k > 0 is the natural salience of
issue k if no campaign resources are spent. The relative eﬀectiveness parameters capture situations
where a party may be more or less eﬀective at increasing the salience of certain issues. For exam-
ple, a Green Party campaign highlighting the dangers of nuclear energy increases the salience of
environmental issues more than a Green campaign about public safety increases the salience of law
and order issues. In addition, the eﬀectiveness parameters also capture inter-party diﬀerences where
the conservatives more eﬀectively increase the salience of foreign policy than communist parties. In
other words, these eﬀectiveness parameters capture a party’s ability to convince voters an issue is
important. In contrast, the natural salience parameters  k model situations in which certain issues
are inherently more important to voters. For example, on average, voters find economic performance
more important in their vote choice than farm subsidies.
In words, s¯k maps campaign spending into the salience of dimension k. We use s¯( ) =
(s¯1( ), ..., s¯K( )) to denote the product of the salience functions. While the analysis to follow
assumes the specific functional form in Eq. 1, it has a very intuitive interpretation. The salience of
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an issue, or the probability that a voter thinks the issue is important, is the amount of resources
devoted to the issue divided by the total of all the resources spent in the campaign. In addition,
s¯k captures three important features of issue salience which are common in the literature (Amorós
and Puy 2010, 2013; Aragonès, Castanheira and Giani 2012; Rozenas 2009).3 First, the salience of
issue k is strictly increasing in each party’s investment into the issue ( jk) and the issue’s under-
lying population salience ( k). In other words, campaigning on an issue only makes voters more
likely to vote according to that issue. Second, sk imposes a decreasing marginal rate of return on
investment in the sense that a party becomes less eﬀective at manipulating the salience of any issue
when considerable resources have already been spent. That is, a party with a campaign budget
of $10, 000 more eﬀectively manipulates the salience of various issues when the other parties are
spending $1, 000 rather than $1 million. Third, and most importantly, issue k’s salience is strictly
decreasing in the parties’ investment in other issues and the natural salience of other issues. Thus,
when all parties campaign on economic performance this drowns out the importance of other issues
in the election.
Party j seeks to maximize its expected vote share V j . Here we assume that voters (who need
not be modelled) vote according to their preferences on the issues they believe is most important,
and this most important issue is determined stochastically from party campaigns. To account for
this, when issue k is completely salient under profile  , i.e. s¯k( ) = 1, all voters vote according
to their preferences on issue k, and party j’s vote share is vjk 2 [0, 1]. We label vjk as party j’s
expected vote share on issue k and assume that for all issues k,
P
j v
j
k = 1.
4 When no single-issue is
perfectly salient, a party j’s expected vote share is a weighted sum of vjk. Specifically, for a profile
of investments  , party j’s vote share can be written as
V j( ) =
X
k
s¯k( )v
j
k.
Thus, voters are not optimizing a spatial utility function when casting their ballots and only the
issue they care about influences their vote choice. Notice that the issue on which they base their
vote is a random variable, and in this sense, our model is behavioral. Voters potentially care about
many issues, but when they walk into a ballot box, they choose an issue on which to vote according
to some probability distribution.
Party payoﬀs are their vote share minus their campaign eﬀorts. Formally, the utility function
of party j is uj : ⇤! R where
uj( ) = V j ( )   j
X
k
 jk (2)
3In particular, the first and third assumptions are common to Amorós and Puy (2010, 2013); Aragonès, Castanheira
and Giani (2012); and Rozenas (2009), and the second assumption is satisfied by many of the examples in Amorós
and Puy (2010).
4While there is a significant possibility that a party’s eﬀectiveness at campaigning on an issue,  jk and its expected
vote share on the same issue vjk are positively correlated, we need not place further assumptions on the relationship
between the two parameters. Furthermore, in dominant two-party systems, e.g. the United States, parties such as the
Green Party may face an added diﬃculty in influencing the thought-process of voters’ even on environmental issues
due to their non-mainstream status.
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for all allocations   2 ⇤. The parameter  j   0 captures the cost of campaign eﬀort or the marginal
rate of substitution between resources and vote share for party j. When  j = 0, the party has a
budget Rj and seeks to spend all its money. When  j > 0, the party values its resources, which could
happen if campaign resources carry over to the next election or if resources also include volunteers
who may become disillusioned after working for too many hours.
In the game where parties are choosing  j simultaneously, our equilibrium concept is Nash,
where a strategy for party j is an allocation of resources across issues.
4 Remarks
Two remarks are in order before proceeding to the analysis of the game. First, we oﬀer two inter-
pretations about the parties’ vote shares across issues, one based on issue ownership and another
based on the Downsian model. Second, we briefly discuss previous models of parties manipulating
issue salience and how these models diﬀer from ours and the substantive literature detailed above.
According to the vote ownership literature, parties own certain issues, and once voters decide what
issue is important, they vote for the party that owns the issue (Budge and Farlie 1983b; Petrocik
1996). Although some approaches model issue ownership as fluid (Aragonès, Castanheira and Giani
2012; Meguid 2007), Petrocik (1996, p. 826) labels issue owners as the “critical constants” in an
electoral system originating from the historical performance and support of each party (see also
Bowler 1990). Thus, we can interpret vjk as the probability that a random voter believes party j
owns issue k (or solves problem k better than the other parties). Therefore, vote choice need not
reflect strategic voting or minimizing the distance between a voter’s ideal policy and a candidate’s
because these beliefs are stochastic and subject to manipulation. Furthermore, in the pure ownership
model, we can assume that for each issue k, there exists party j such that vjk = 1 to capture the
possibility that every issue has one unique owner and when a voter cares about issue k she votes
for its owner. However, empirically, studies find that voters associate multiple owners with a single
issue (Budge and Farlie 1983b; Petrocik 1996; Bélanger and Meguid 2008), and this holds even in
two party systems. Therefore, we do not restrict the general setup to a pure ownership model but
acknowledge that it is an important specification of the expected issue vote shares.
Nonetheless, the model presented in the last section does not rule out a more Downsian inter-
pretation when voters’ spatial preferences over parties along one dimension do not depend on the
parties’ policy positions along all other dimensions. In this case, the voters have separable policy
preferences, and the parameter vjk denotes the percentage of the electorate that has an ideal point on
dimension k closest to party j. In other words, voters have circular indiﬀerence curves or elliptical-
shaped ones whose axes correspond to the Cartesian axes, and when a voter cares about an issue,
she votes according to her party preferences on that issue, which does not depend on the party’s
other issue positions, by assumption.5 To better see how our framework incorporates this type of
electoral competition, suppose there are two dimensions and three parties. The parties have policy
platforms xˆj and assume the unit mass of voters – indexed by i – have ideal points xˆi distributed
over [0, 1]⇥ [0, 1] according to the cumulative distribution function F (x1, x2). When voter i believes
5For a more in-depth discussion of separable preferences see Austen-Smith and Banks (2005, p. 62).
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1
(1, 1)
1
Party 3
Party 2
Party 1
v32
v12
v12
v11 v
2
1 v
3
1
Figure 1: A Downsian interpretation of the model. Here voters have ideal points xˆi distributed over
[0, 1]⇥[0, 1] according to distribution F (x1, x2), with corresponding marginal distributions F1(x1) and F2(x2).
When voters who care about issue k minimize the distance between their ideal policy on issue k and the
policy platform of their vote choice, we can compute a party expected vote share on issue k using the
marginal distributions. For example, Party 3’s vote share on issue 2 is v32 = 1  F2
⇣
xˆ12+xˆ
3
2
2
⌘
, and Party 1’s
vote share on issue 1 is v11 = F1
⇣
xˆ11+xˆ
2
1
2
⌘
.
dimension k = 1, 2 is important, she chooses the party j that minimizes the distance |xˆjk   xˆik|. For
example, the policy platforms could look like those in Figure 1. Then Party 1’s expected vote share
on issue 1 can be expressed as v11 = F1
⇣
xˆ11+xˆ
2
1
2
⌘
, where F1(x1) is the marginal distribution of F with
respect to x1. Likewise, Party 2’s expected vote share on issue 1 is v21 = F1
⇣
xˆ21+xˆ
3
1
2
⌘
  F1
⇣
xˆ11+xˆ
2
1
2
⌘
,
and Party 3’s is v31 = 1 F1
⇣
xˆ21+xˆ
3
1
2
⌘
. We compute the expected vote shares over the second issue in
a similar manner, but now the ordering of the party changes and we use the marginal distribution
over x2, F2. While this Downsian interpretation still depends on our critical behavorial assumption
that voters care only about one issue and this issue is determined stochastically according to the
parties’ campaigns and natural salience, it illustrates that the model of campaigning presented in
the previous section addresses these two theories of voting behavior.
Second, previous models of issue salience also assume that voters have separable preferences
across issues. In general, they take the following form. A voter i’s utility function can be written as
ui(j) =
X
k
↵ku
i
k(j),
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where uik is voter i’s utility function for issue k and ↵k are the endogenous salience parameters.
In Amorós and Puy (2010, 2013) and Rozenas (2009), these component utility functions take the
form of quadratic distance between the voter’s ideal point and candidate j’s platform on issue k. In
Aragonès, Castanheira and Giani (2012), the competent utilities are linear and strictly increasing
in xˆjk because the policy platforms are public goods in the sense that xˆ
j
k is the quality of party j’s
policy addressing issue k. Unlike our model, these previous ones assume voters care about more than
one issue at time when deciding their vote choice. However, this setup comes with two potential
drawbacks. Theoretically, this makes the calculations of candidates more complicated, which results
in an absence of a pure strategy equilibrium (Amorós and Puy 2010, 2013; Rozenas 2009) even
with two parties and two issues or the needed assumptions of candidate symmetry and preference
homogeneity of voters over party platforms (Aragonès, Castanheira and Giani 2012). Substantively,
it does not capture the interaction between a voter’s preferences over issues and her perception of
whether the issue is important. Thus, the setup may not model the types of voters prevalent in the
issue-ownership theories.
5 Dominated Strategies and Equilibrium Existence
This section discusses the possibilities of strictly dominated and dominant strategies and the neces-
sary conditions for a party to invest in multiple dimensions. We then use these results to identify
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a Nash Equilibrium.
Intuitively, party j’s vote share is a weighted average of the party’s expected vote share across
issues, where the weight or the importance of an issue is strictly increasing in its dedicated resources.
When campaign resources are valuable, i.e.,  j > 0, or when the smallest expected vote share is
diﬀerent than the largest, a party would never want to invest in the issue with the smallest vote
share. Doing so would only decrease its average vote share, V j , with some potential cost. The next
lemma states this formally.
Lemma 1 Suppose there exists party j and dimension k such that vjk  vjk0 for all issues k0. If
 j > 0 or if vjk  vjk0 holds with a strict inequality for one k0 6= k, then any strategy  j such that
 jk > 0 is strictly dominated strategy.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the derivative of uj with respect to  jk, denoted Dku
j . Specif-
ically, we have
Dku
j =  jk
P
k0(v
j
k   vjk0)
h
 k0 +
P
j0  
j0
k0 
j0
k0
i
⇣P
k00
h
 k00 +
P
j  
j0
k00 
j0
k00
i⌘2    j
=  jk
vjk   V j( )⇣P
k00
h
 k00 +
P
j  
j0
k00 
j0
k00
i⌘    j . (3)
Note that vjk   vjk0  0 for all dimensions k0 under the conditions of the proposition. Then  j > 0
or vjk < v
j
k0 for some dimension k
0 ensure that Dkuj is strictly less than zero for all strategy profiles
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 . Hence, any strategy  j such that  jk > 0 will be strictly dominated by the strategy µ
j 2 ⇤j such
that µjk = 0 and µ
j
k0 =  
j
k0 for all k 6= k0.
We label the issue that gives a party its lowest (highest) expected vote share as its dominated
(dominant) issue. Equation 3 also reveals the utility calculations behind the parties’ campaign
strategies. Party j’s marginal benefit in emphasizing issue k increases as the diﬀerence between j’s
expected vote share on issue k and some other issue k0 increases. Thus parties look for relative
advantages rather than absolute advantages. This is a departure from previous expositions of issue-
ownership theories of party competition in which parties emphasize issues which they own or will
win on if they can convince the electorate the issue is important. It is therefore possible that a
party campaigns on an issue even if the expected vote on the issue is very small. In this case, its
expected vote share on other issues is even smaller. In addition, the natural salience of issue k,
 k, decreases the marginal eﬀect in Eq. 3. Thus, as an issue becomes more naturally important to
voters, candidates will spend less time and energy convincing voters that the issue is important.
Unfortunately, a clean characterization of strictly dominant strategies and issues does not exist
because a party’s benefit from investing in an issue depends on the amount of resources already
devoted to the issue, its eﬀectiveness of campaigning on the issue, and the degree to which it owns
the issue, i.e., the size of vjk. To see this, note that even if party j completely owns issue k, i.e.,
vjk = 1, the party may not campaign on this issue if  
j or  k are suﬃciently large or if it is not very
eﬀective at campaigning on this issue. Nonetheless, once we fix a profile actions of all other parties
except one, the remaining party will almost always best respond by investing either in one issue or
no issues. Parties engage in single-issue campaigning because, if they campaigned on two issues, the
marginal eﬀect of these two investments on their vote shares must be equal. If not, then parties could
transfer resources from one issue to the other, thereby increasing their vote share, which means the
initial allocation of resources was not a best response. The requirement that the marginal eﬀects of
two issues are equal establishes a knife-edge characterization which must hold when a party invests
in two-dimensions at the same time. The next lemma states this result formally.
Lemma 2 Consider some profile  . Then Dkuj( )   Dluj( ) if and only if
 jk(v
j
k   V j( ))    jl (vjl   V j( )).
Proof. This follows from the derivation of the Dkuj in Lemma 1.
Thus, in equilibrium, if a party invests in two issues, then the weak inequality in the above
Lemma holds with equality. In other words, a party almost always invests in one issue when best
responding to the campaign investments of other parties, and parties develop a unified or coherent
campaign message. This result then suggests an important relationship between the number of
parties and the number of issues in a campaign. When every party is generically investing in at most
one issue, the number of parties can serve as an upper bound on the number of issues emphasized
during a campaign. The issue emphasized by a party, however, is ambiguous because one issue may
give the party its highest vote share and another may be the one on which the party most eﬀectively
campaigns. For example, the inequality in Lemma 2 illustrates that when a party’s expected vote
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share is relatively large (V j( ) close to vjk), it values issues on which they are very eﬀective. When a
party’s expected vote share is relatively small (V j( ) close to 0), it values issues which they are more
likely to own. Taken together, these two preliminary lemmas oﬀer some confidence that the model
captures an important aspect of previous substantive theories and provide some tractability in the
subsequent analysis. The next proposition states two suﬃcient conditions or equilibrium existence
in pure strategies.
Proposition 1 A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists if any of the following conditions hold.
1. There are two issues, that is, K = 2.
2. Parties are most eﬀective on their dominant issue, that is, for all j, there exists an issue kj
such that vjkj   vjk0 and  jkj    jk0 for all issues k0.
Proof. See Appendix.
In words, the proposition says that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists if there or two issues
or there is suﬃcient correlation in parties’ issue vote shares, vjk, and their campaign eﬀectiveness,
 jk. We briefly note that straightforward applications of general existence results, e.g. the Debreu-
Glicksberg-Fan Theorem (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, p. 34), do not apply here because the general
model does not guarantee that uj is quasi-concave in  j . Nonetheless, if we impose a suﬃciently
convex, rather than linear, cost of investment in Eq. 2, this would make the utility function concave
and establish pure-strategy equilibrium existence more generally.6 Since our results below do not
require this convexity, there is little need to introduce this complication in the setup.
6 The Two Party and Two Issue Case
In this section, we characterize equilibria in the model when two parties campaign over two issues.
Doing so provides insight into party competition in the issue-ownership model. We write the set
of parties as {A,B} to more easily diﬀerentiate parties from issues. Due to the model’s numerous
parameters, there is an embarrassment of cases in a general equilibrium analysis. To simplify the
analysis we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 Define the following three assumptions.
(1A) Party A “favors” dimension 1, that is, vA1 > vA2 .
(1B) Resources are costly, that is,  j > 0 for parties j = A,B.
(1C) Rj is large for parties j = A,B.
In words, Assumption (1A) that Party A receives a higher expected vote share on issue 1 than
issue 2 is without loss of generality. If vA1 < vA2 , we could always relabel the dimensions. If vA1 = vA2 ,
then both parties investing no resources into either dimension is an equilibrium because V j( ) is
constant in the profiles  , and campaigns do not eﬀect vote shares. Indeed, when resources are costly
(1B), then this is the unique equilibrium because parties would pay some cost without the ability to
6More specifically, we would write uj( ) = V j ( )  cj
⇣P
k  
j
k
⌘
, where cj(x) is the cost to party j of investing x
amount of resources in the campaign and D2c(x) is suﬃciently large or positive.
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increase (or decrease) their vote shares.7 Taken together, the second and third assumptions mean
that parties can always raise more campaign resources, but these resources are costly. Technically,
(1B) and (1C) ensure that we do not have to worry about equilibria in which campaigns completely
spend their resources Rj .8 Substantively, these assumptions encourage comparative statics on opti-
mal campaign strategies and issue emphasis, which have remained absent in previous analyses. The
next proposition presents the main result of the paper.
Proposition 2 Assume (1A)-(1C) and there are two parties competing over two issues. Then the
following results hold.
1. There exists a unique equilibrium.
2. In the unique equilibrium  ¯ in which both parties invest positive resources, Party A invests 
 ¯A1 , 0
 
, where
 ¯A1 =
 A1  
B
2  
B(vA1   vA2 ) 
 A1  
B +  B2  
A
 2    1 A1 ,
and Party B invests (0,  ¯B2 ) where
 ¯B2 =
 B2  
A
1  
A(vA1   vA2 ) 
 A1  
B +  B2  
A
 2    2 B2 .
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, not only does an equilibrium exist, it is unique, and the two parties never invest in the
same issue.9 In other words, parties “talk past each other” in elections, and the model uncovers the
“dominance principle” in which a party ignores the issue on which its competitor has an advantage.
This result is similar to previous models of salience (Amorós and Puy 2010, 2013; Aragonès, Castan-
heira and Giani 2012) which have found that issue-divergence rather than issue-convergence persists
in equilibrium. In addition, this relates to Petrocik’s (1996) argument that candidates “argue along
lines that play to the issue strength of their party, and sidestep their opponent’s issue assets” (p.
829) and “will not usually engage in text-book debates with each disputing points raised by their
opponents” (p. 831).
When both parties make positive investments in their non-dominated issue, these equilibrium
investments are functions of the model’s primitives. For example, the investments vary with the
eﬀectiveness parameter  jk and the cost parameters  
j because these determine the cost-eﬀectiveness
of a party’s campaign. In addition, the equilibrium investments depend on the natural salience
of each issue because these determine how much parties need to invest to appreciably alter the
salience of an issue. More importantly, the parties’ investments depend on the diﬀerence between
the expected vote shares on each issue because when Party A campaigns on issue 1, this not only
increases salience of its strongest issue, but it also reduces the salience of the weaker issues. In
other words, there are two eﬀects of campaign investments: a direct one through increasing the
7Without (1B), vA1 = v
A
2 implies every strategy profile is an equilibrium.
8When there are only two issues, uj will be strictly concave in j’s non-dominated issue and have a maximizer,
thereby guaranteeing that a party will never spend an infinite amount of resources.
9See the Appendix for details concerning other equilibria.
14
Endogenous Issue Salience Ascencio and Gibilisco
salience of the campaign issue and an indirect one through decreasing the salience of the remaining
issues. This leads to a “spillover eﬀect” where B’s eﬀectiveness on the second issue determines A’s
equilibrium investment on the first issue. The intuition for the spillover is as follows. Party A’s
investment in issue 1 depends on Party B’s eﬀectiveness in issue 2 because as B becomes mores
eﬀective at campaigning on its strong issue, the party campaigns more. This means that A needs
to campaign more on issue 1 if it wishes to highlight its strong issue to the same degree. The next
proposition more precisely states how these primitives aﬀect equilibrium investments and highlights
this recursive nature of the two campaigns.
Proposition 3 In the equilibrium in which both parties invest positive resources, the following
relationships hold.
1. Party A’s equilibrium investment in issue 1 is increasing in the diﬀerence in A’s vote shares
across the two dimensions (vA1   vA2 ) and decreasing in A’s cost of eﬀort ( A) and issue 1’s
natural salience ( 1).
2. Party A’s equilibrium investment in issue 1 has an inverse-U (negative quadratic) relationship
with A’s eﬀectiveness at campaigning on issue 1 ( A1 ) and Party B’s eﬀectiveness on issue 2
( B2 ) and cost of eﬀort ( B).
3. The comparative statics for Party B are symmetric.
The proof of the proposition follows straightforwardly from the derivative of  ¯A1 with respect to
its various parameters. In other words, increasing vA1 or decreasing vA2 incentivizes Party A to invest
more resources in her dominant issue because, in the first case, the party highlights an increasingly
favorable issue and, in the second case, it drowns the importance of an increasingly unfavorable one.
As mentioned above, parties emphasize issues on which they have a relative advantage, and as this
relative advantage increases so do resources devoted to the issue. In addition, increasing the natural
salience of issue 1 decreases A’s optimal investment because voters already believe A’s favorable
issue is important. Finally, increasing a party’s cost to raise campaign resources decreases its overall
spending.
The quadratic relationships in Proposition 3 are slightly more complicated, but they illustrate
the recursive nature of the two campaigns in equilibrium. First, a party’s campaign spending on
its favorable issue has a inverse-U relationship with its eﬀectiveness on the issue and the competing
party’s eﬀectiveness on the remaining issue. For example, when B’s eﬀectiveness on its favorable
issue ( B2 ) increases at small values, B more easily increases the salience of her issue, which means A
must spend more to convince voters her issue is important. However, when ( B2 ) increases at large
values, A realizes B is very eﬀective at campaigning and begins to spend less resources. In turn, this
means B needs to exert less eﬀort to convince voters. More generally, in the interior equilibrium,
A’s spending is maximized when B’s eﬀectiveness is
 A1  
B
 A
.
At this value, B’s equilibrium spending is strictly increasing in her eﬀectiveness.10 If the parties
10This relationship follows from necessary and suﬃcient first and second order conditions on  ¯A1 and the first
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Figure 2: A party’s level of campaign spending has a inverse-U relationship with its eﬀectivess on its
favorable issue and the eﬀectiveness of the other party on the competing issue.
share the same cost of raising money ( A =  B), then the campaign will be most fierce, or consume
the largest amount of resources, when one party is slightly more eﬀective than other.
Figure 2 presents a graphic representation of this logic. In this graph, the horizontal axis denotes
B’s eﬀectiveness on the second issue and the vertical axis the parties’ equilibrium campaigning
eﬀorts. Initially, for  B2 close to zero, Party B’s eﬀectiveness has a positive relationship with Party
A’s campaign spending, because as B finds it easier to spend, A compensates. However, when  B2
becomes larger, it has a negative relationship with A’s spending levels because A cannot adequately
compete against Party B. As A campaigns less, Party B no longer needs to exert much eﬀort into
the campaign.
In a similar vein, when Party B’s cost of campaigning increases, the party campaigns less. This
means that A can more easily influence the salience of its issue, but at the same time, it does not
need to invest considerable campaign resources to do so. When  B is small, the first incentive to
spend more dominates. When  B is large, the second incentive to spend less dominates. This results
in an inverse-U relationship between Party A’s spending and B’s cost of resources similar to the one
with B’s eﬀectiveness.
Before examining a version of the model with three parties, we briefly discuss endogenous plat-
form placement in the two party model. To do so, return to the Downsian interpretation in Section
4. Now assume voter ideal points are distributed over R2 according to some distribution F with
marginal distributions F1 and F2 (although this argument applies with more than two possible
issues). Consider the following setup. First, parties simultaneously choose xj 2 R2 as policy plat-
forms. The platforms are revealed to both parties, and then the parties play the unique equilibrium
in Proposition 2 when  j > 0. In any sub-game perfect equilibrium, the two parties should locate
at the dimension-by-dimension median (x†1, x
†
2), where x
†
k is the median of the marginal distribution
Fk. In other words, because voters will only care about one issue when voting, the placement game
inherits the Downsian incentive to locate at the median. Yet these results require two-party compe-
tition, and it is likely that with three or more parties the model inherits the equilibrium existence
derivative of  ¯B2 with respect to  
B
2 when  
B
2 =
 A1  
B
 A
.
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problems from the one dimensional case as well.
7 An Example with Three Parties and Free Riding
In this section, we use the model to examine why parties campaign on the same issue. As the
previous section demonstrates, when there are only two parties and two issues, this type of issue-
sharing never occurs as parties always “talk past each other.” Thus, in this section, we consider
three parties labelled A, B, and C who must compete over issues 1 and 2. Party C owns issue 2,
i.e., vC2 = 1, and parties A and B share issue one, i.e., vA1 = ↵ = 1  vB1 , where ↵ 2
⇥
1
2 , 1
⇤
. In other
words, parties A and B may be two left parties who share ownership of the redistribution issue (1),
with Party A – perhaps the communists – owning redistribution more than B –perhaps, the center
left – while Party C represents a right party that owns the fiscal responsibility issue (2).
We characterize an equilibrium in which both Party A and Party B invest resources into issue
1. Denote this equilibrium  ˜. By Lemma 1,  ˜A2 =  ˜B2 =  ˜C1 = 0 because these issues are dominated
issues for the parties, respectively. To simplify the analysis, we make two further assumptions. First,
we assume  j =   for all parties j; in other words, all parties have the same marginal cost of eﬀort.
This makes sense if Rj represents monetary resources in a campaign war chest. However, even if
this appears restrictive, this assumption does not mean all parties have the same marginal rate of
return on investment because the  jk still vary. Second, we assume that   is suﬃciently small, where
  <
 C2  1
( 1 +  2 +  A1 R
A +  B1 R
B +  C2 R
C)2
. (4)
Substantively, the inequality in Eq. 4 implies that parties are encouraged to campaign because raising
resources is not too costly. Technically, it guarantees that D2uC( ) > 0 for all profiles   2 ⇤, so
Party C invests  ˜C2 = RC in equilibrium. This means we only need to pin down  ˜A1 and  ˜B1 .
To do so, first note that D1uA = D1uB if and only if
↵ =
1
 A1 +  
B
2
. (5)
Thus, if  ˜ is an equilibrium such that both A and B invest some but not all of their resources, i.e.,
 ˜j1 2 (0, Rj) for j = A,B, then the equality in Eq. 5 holds. Furthermore, if both A and B invest some
but not all campaign resources in equilibrium  ˜, then every   2 ⇤ such that  A1 +  B1 =  ˜A1 +  ˜B1 ,
 A2 =  
B
2 =  
C
1 = 0, and  C2 = RC is an equilibrium. This continuum of equilibria arises because
parties A and B have the same marginal benefits and costs of campaigning on issue 1. Thus, they
only ensure  ˜A1 +  ˜B1 is invested in equilibrium.
When the inequality in Eq. 5 does not hold, more interesting equilibrium behavior arises. With-
out loss of generality, assume  A1 ↵ >  B1 (1 ↵), which holds when  A1 >  B1 . Then, D1uA > D1uB ,
so one party must always play a corner solution. If Party A does not invest its entire budget
( ˜A1 < RA), then B invests no resources ( ˜B1 = 0). If Party B invests a positive amount ( ˜B1 > 0),
then Party A must invests all its resources ( ˜ = RA). That is, when   is large, Party B “free rides”
17
Endogenous Issue Salience Ascencio and Gibilisco
on the campaign of Party A and does not invest. When   is small, Party A invests all its resources
and only then does Party B invest some positive amount. We present this result formally in the
following proposition, which implicity assumes the assumptions throughout the section.
Proposition 4 There exists a unique equilibrium  ˜ such that  ˜A2 =  ˜B2 =  ˜C1 = 0 and  ˜C2 = RC .
Furthermore, there exists bounds  ⇤ and  ⇤⇤ such that 0 <  ⇤ <  ⇤⇤ and the following hold.
1. If      ⇤⇤, then parties A and B invest  ˜A1 =  ˜B1 = 0.
2. If   2 [ ⇤,  ⇤⇤), then A invests  ˜A1 > 0 and B invests  ˜B1 = 0.
3. If   2 [0,  ⇤], then A invests  ˜A1 = RA and B invests  ˜B1 > 0.
Substantively, these results provide another reason why parties campaign on the same issue
besides attempting to hurt the vote share of a rival (Meguid 2007) or steal ownership (Holian 2004;
Sides 2006). The proposition means that distinct parties j and j0 both campaign on an issue k when
one party exhausts all of its resources on the issue and another party still finds it beneficial to increase
the issue’s salience after this initial investment. For instance, suppose j is a radical Green party
and j0 is a major popular center-left party. The radical Greens “own” an issue about environmental
policy in the sense that  jkv
j
k >  
j0
k v
j0
k , or in words, it may be more eﬀective at campaigning on the
issue and/or expect a larger vote share on the same issue. Then the Greens exhaust their resources
before the center-left begins campaigning on the environment. However, this party is a niche party
and may not possess a large amount of electoral resources. When this happens, the center-left
potentially spends resources to further increase the salience of the issue because doing so increases
the party’s vote share to a considerable degree even after the Greens’ original investment. Thus, the
center-left party free rides on the initial investment by the radical Greens.
8 Conclusion
We present a new model of electoral competition with issue-ownership and endogenous issue salience,
one that closely matches previous substantive theories and empirical results. In the model, parties
compete to influence the salience of an issue, which determines the probability that a random voter
determines her vote choice according to that issue. Thus, voters do not necessarily have Euclidean
preferences, and parties prime voters to care about various issues. In general, parties never emphasize
dominated issues, i.e., the issues with their lowest expected vote share, and they almost always best
responded to the campaigns of others by highlighting only one issue. In two-party competition,
parties talk past each other as the model uncovers Riker’s “dominance principle.” Furthermore, the
campaigns of the two parties are highly interconnected, leading to several non-linearities in issue
emphasis. Finally, with more than two parties, the model highlights potential free-riding problems
in campaigns.
The model synthesizes several new empirical implications. There potentially exists a relationship
between the number of parties and the number of issues emphasized in a campaign, and Lemma 2
suggests that as the number of parties decreases so will the number of issues emphasized. In addition,
campaigns should consume the most resources when parties have similar, but not identical, campaign
capabilities on the issues they own. In addition, Proposition 2 suggests that a party’s optimal issue
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emphasis is a highly non-linear function. While this hints at the problems in regression analyses
attempting to explain or predict campaign issue emphases, it also reveals a significant benefit of
structural estimation to uncover the parameters of interest. In this model, the strategies of the parties
can potentially be measured from campaign advertisements or platform texts, and the expected-vote
shares from survey data. In this case, we should be able to uncover the relative campaign eﬀectiveness
and the natural salience parameters. Theoretically, the model can be expanded to investigate the
dynamic of issue-ownership. Campaigning on an issue likely has two consequences. In the short
term, it increases the salience of a given issue, but in the long-term it also increases a party’s
ownership of the issue. Thus, there is potentially a dynamic trade-oﬀ between short- and long-term
party electoral strategy.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 Restated: A Nash Equilibrium exists if any of the following conditions hold.
1. There are two issues, that is, K = 2.
2. Parties are eﬀective on the issues they own; that is, for all j, there exists an issue kj 2 {1, ...,K}
such that vjkj   vjk0 and  jkj    jk0 for all issues k0.
Proof. (1.) When there are only two dimensions, either V j is constant in  j , that is, vj1 = v
j
2 or v
j
k >
vj3 k, for some k = 1, 2. In the first case, u
j is quasi-concave in  j because uj( ) = vj1   j( j1+ j2).
In the second case, investing any resources into issue 3  k is strictly dominated. In addition, V j is
then strictly concave in  jk. Thus, u
j is concave in non-dominated strategies, and the DGF Theorem
guarantees existence because uj is continuous and ⇤j is convex and compact.
(2.) Consider some profile   j . We claim that the set of j’s best responses to   j—label itBj(  j)—
is convex, which means that the DGF Theorem implies that an equilibrium exists, as in the previous
proof. To see this, let M j ✓ {1, ...,K} denote the set of issues k such that vjk   vjk0 and  jk    jk0
for all k0 = 1, ...,K. This set is non-empty by assumption, so define k⇤ = minM j , which exists.
Throughout, we assume there exists an issue k 6= k⇤ such that vjk⇤ > vjk, that is, M j ( {1, ...,K}.
If M j = {1, ...,K}, then V j is constant in  i. This would mean Bj(  j) consists of either the zero
vector ( j > 0) or the entire strategy space ⇤j ( j = 0), both of which are convex.
We now establish three preliminary claims. First note that Bj(  j) ✓ { j |  jl = 0, 8l /2 M j}
because for any k 2 M j , any l 2 {1, ...,K} \M j , and any profile  , Dkuj( ) > Dluj( ) by Lemma
2. Second, note that Bj(  j) is non-empty because uj(·,  j) is a continuous function and ⇤j is a
convex and compact set. Now define the profile ↵¯j 2 ⇤j as follows:
↵¯j = arg max
 j : jk=0,k 6=k⇤
uj( j ,  j).
The profile ↵¯j exists and is unique. To see this, note that [0, Rj ] is convex and compact. In addition,
uj is continuous and strictly concave in  jk⇤ because the second derivative of u
j with respect to  jk⇤
is
 2
⇣
 jk⇤
⌘2 Pk(vjk⇤   vjk) h k0 +Pj0  j0k0 j0k0i⇣P
k
h
 k +
P
j0  
j0
k  
j0
k
i⌘3 ,
which is strictly less than zero because  k > 0 and vjk⇤   vjk   0 for all k and is positive for at least
one k 6= k⇤ by assumption. Third, for all  i 2 S, where
S =
(
 j |
X
k2Mj
 jk =
X
k
↵¯jk and  
j
l = 0, 8l /2M j
)
,
uj( j ,  j) = uj(↵¯j ,  j) because vjk = v
j
k0 and  
j
k =  
j
k0 for all k, k
0 2M j .
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We now demonstrate that Bj(  j) = S. To do so, consider some  j 2 Bj(  j), which exists by
the second claim, and suppose  j /2 S. Because  j is a best response,  jl = 0 for all l /2 M j by the
first claim above. This means
P
k2Mj  
j
k 6=
P
k ↵¯
j
k by the third claim. Without loss of generality
assume
P
k2Mj  
j
k <
P
k ↵¯
j
k. Then
P
k ↵¯
j
k > 0, which means Dk⇤u
j(↵¯j ,  j))   0 is the necessary
first-order condition for maximization procedure above. Then we have
Dk⇤u
j( ) =  jk⇤
vjk⇤   V j( )P
k  k +
P
j0  
j0
k  
j0
k
   ⇤
>  jk⇤
vjk⇤   V j(↵¯j ,  j)P
k  k +
P
j0  
j0
k  
j0
k
   j
>  jk⇤
vjk⇤   V j(↵¯j ,  j)
 jk⇤
P
k ↵¯
j
k +
P
k  k +
P
j0 6=j  
j0
k  
j0
k
   j
= Dk⇤u
j(↵¯j ,  j))
  0,
where the inequalities follow because there exists some k such that vjk < v
j
k⇤ and
P
k2Mj  
j
k <
P
k ↵¯
j
k.
So j has a profitable deviation by investing more into issue k⇤, which means  j cannot be a best
response, a contradiction.
Now consider some  j 2 S and suppose there exists some µj such that uj(µj ,  j) > uj( j ,  j).
Then let µ¯j denote the profile such that j allocates the total spent resources in profile µj to issue
k⇤ and allocates zero resources to all other issues. That is µ¯j = (0, ...,
P
k µ
j
k, ..., 0), where
P
k µ
j
k is
the k⇤th entry. So we now have
uj(µ¯j ,  j)   uj(µj ,  j) > uj( j ,  j) = uj(↵¯j ,  j),
but this means that ↵¯j does not solve the maximization procedure above, a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2
To prove the proposition, we first use Proposition 1 to guarantee existence. Second, we characterize
the four possible equilibria of the model, which include a unique profile under which both parties
invest positive resources and three “corner” profiles under which at least one party invests no re-
sources. We then show that when one of these equilibria exist, the others do not. Throughout, we
maintain assumptions (1A)-(1C).
Result 1 If ( A, B) is an equilibrium such that  A1 > 0 and  B2 > 0, then  A =
 
 ¯A1 , 0
 
and
 B =
 
 ¯B2 , 0
 
.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium ( A, B) such that  A1 > 0 and  B2 > 0. Then  A2 =  B2 = 0. In
addition, D1uA = 0 and D2uB = 0. Using Eq. 3 and solving for ( A1 , B2 ) gives us the polynomials
in the proposition. The solutions are maximizers because the second derivative of uA with respect
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 A1 , denoted D21uA, is
D21u
A =  2   A1  2 (vA1   vA2 )( A1  ¯A1 +  1)( 1 +  A1  ¯A1 +  2 B2  ¯B2 )3 ,
which is strictly less than zero by (A1). The same holds for D22uB .
Define the following strategies:
 ˆA1 =
q
(vA1   vA2 )
 
 A1
 3
 A 2    A1  A( 1 +  2) 
 A1
 2
 A
(6)
and
 ˆB2 =
q
(vA1   vA2 )
 
 B2
 3
 B 1    B2  B( 1 +  2) 
 B2
 2
 B
(7)
Result 2 Party A’s unique best response to Party B’s investment (0, 0) is
⇣
max
n
0,  ˆA1
o
, 0
⌘
, and
Party B’s unique best response to Party A’s investment (0, 0) is
⇣
0,max
n
0,  ˆB2
o⌘
.
Proof. We prove the result for Party A. Assume Party B invests (0, 0). Then the necessary and
suﬃcient first order condition D1uA = 0 is equivalent to A investing  ˆA1 . This best response is unique
because uA is strictly concave in  A1 . If  ˆA1 < 0, strict concavity guarantees that uA is decreasing in
 A1 . In this case, A’s best response is to invest 0 in the first issue.
Result 3 Party A’s unique best response to Party B’s investment
⇣
0,  ˆB2
⌘
when  ˆB2 > 0 is (0, 0)
if and only if  ¯A1 < 0, and Party B’s unique best response to Party A’s investment
⇣
 ˆA1 , 0
⌘
when
 ˆA1 > 0 is (0, 0) if and only if  ¯B2 < 0.
Proof. We prove the result for Party B. Fix A’s strategy at
⇣
 ˆA1 , 0
⌘
when  ˆA1 > 0. For Party B to
invest 0 in issue 2, we must guarantee D2uB < 0. To see this, note that when  ˆA1 > 0, we have
D2u
B < 0 ()   B +  B2
q
(vA1   vA2 )
 
 A1
 3
 A 2    A1  A 2
 A1  2
< 0
()  2 > ( 
B
2 )
2 A1  
A(vA1   vA2 )
( A1  
B +  B2  
A)2
,
which is equivalent to  ¯B2 < 0.
Result 4 There are four potential equilibria, which are as follows:
1.
  
 ¯A1 , 0
 
,
 
0,  ¯B2
  
2.
⇣⇣
 ˆA1 , 0
⌘
, (0, 0)
⌘
3.
⇣
(0, 0) ,
⇣
 ˆB2 , 0
⌘⌘
4. ((0, 0) , (0, 0))
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Proof. (1) This equilibrium exists if and only if  ¯A1   0 and  ¯B2   0 by Result 1.
(2) This equilibrium exists if and only if  ˆA1 > 0 and  ¯B2  0 by Results 2 and 3.
(3) This equilibrium exists if and only if  ˆB2 > 0 and  ¯A2  0 by Results 2 and 3.
(4) This equilibrium exists in all other cases by Proposition 1 and the three previous statements.
We now prove the uniqueness of each of the potential equilibria.
Uniqueness of (1). Suppose
  
 ¯A1 , 0
 
,
 
0,  ¯B2
  
is an equilibrium, and suppose   is another equilib-
rium such that   6=    ¯A1 , 0  ,  0,  ¯B2   . By Lemma 1,  A2 =  B1 = 0. By Result 1, there is an unique
interior equilibrium, so either  A1 = 0 or  B2 = 0. Without loss of generality, consider the case in
which  A1 = 0. If  B2 > 0, then Result 2 implies  B2 =  ˆB2 . Result 3 then implies D1uA > 0, a
contradiction because A can deviate by investing some small amount into issue 1. If  B2 = 0, we
must rule out the case in which ((0, 0), (0, 0)) is an equilibrium. To do so, without loss of generality
suppose  2    1. then
D1u
A((0, 0), (0, 0)) =  A1
(vA1   vA2 ) 2
( 1 +  2)2
   A
   A1
(vA1   vA2 )
 
 2 +  B2  ¯
B
2
  
 1 +  2 +  B2  ¯
B
2
 2    A
>  A1
(vA1   vA2 )( 2 +  B2  ¯B2 ) 
 1 +  A1  ¯
A
1 +  2 +  
B
2  ¯
B
2
 2    A
= D1u
A
  
 ¯A1 , 0
 
,
 
0,  ¯B2
  
= 0,
where the first inequality follows because  A1
(vA1  vA2 )( 2+x)
( 1+ 2+x)2
is (weakly) decreasing in x   0 when
 2    1, the second because D21uA < 0, and the final equality because
  
 ¯A1 , 0
 
,
 
0,  ¯B2
  
. But
D1uA((0, 0), (0, 0)) > 0 implies A has a profitable deviation.
Uniqueness of (2) and (3). We prove the uniqueness of the second equilibrium, and an identical
argument proves the uniqueness of the third. Suppose the equilibrium (( ˆA1 , 0), (0, 0)) exists and
suppose   is an equilibrium such that   6= ((( ˆA1 , 0), (0, 0)). By Lemma 1,  A2 =  B1 = 0. By Result
3, the equilibrium in which both candidates invest positively does not exist so either  A1 = 0 or
 B2 = 0. If  B2 = 0, then   = (( ˆA1 , 0), (0, 0)) by Result 3, a contradiction. So  A1 = 0 and  B2 > 0,
and  B2 =  ˆB2 by Result 2. Then either  1    2 or  2    1. Without loss of generality, assume the
latter. Then
D1u
A(( ˆA1 , 0), (0, 0)) = 0 =) D1uA((0, 0), (0, 0)) > 0
=) D1uA((0, 0), (0,  ˆB2 )) > 0,
where the second implication follows from the same logic in the previous proof, i.e.,D1uA((0, 0), (0, B2 ))
is increasing in  B2 , when  2    1. But this means   cannot be an equilibrium because A has a
profitable deviation by investing some small amount in issue 1.
Uniqueness of (4). Suppose the equilibrium ((0, 0) , (0, 0)) exists. The equilibrium in which only one
23
Endogenous Issue Salience Ascencio and Gibilisco
candidate invests positive resources cannot exist becauseD1uA ((0, 0) , (0, 0))  0 (D2uB ((0, 0) , (0, 0)) 
0) and uj is concave in j’s non-dominated issue. Finally, because D1uA ((0, 0) , (0, 0))  0, the string
of inequalities in the proof that demonstrates the uniqueness of the interior equilibrium implies that
A’s (B’s) best response to B’s (A’s) investment of positive resources is to invest zero resources as
well.
Proof of Proposition 4
Let  ˜ be an equilibrium. Note that one indeed exists by Proposition 1. First, recall that  ˜A2 =  ˜B2 =
 ˜C1 = 0 by Lemma 1.
Second,  ˜C2 = 1 because
D2u
C( ˜) =  C2
 1 +  A1  ˜
A
1 +  
B
1  ˜
B
1
( 1 +  A1  ˜
A
1 +  
B
1  ˜
B
1 +  2 +  
C
2  ˜
C
2 )
2
   
   C2
 1
( 1 +  A1 R
A +  B1 R
B +  2 +  C2 R
C)2
   
> 0,
where the last inequality follows by the assumption that   is suﬃciently small. Thus, C always
increases her payoﬀ by investing more, so  ˜C2 = RC .
Third, we pin down equilibrium values of  ˜A1 and  ˜B1 . To do so, we establish two relationships
between  ˜A1 and  ˜B1 . By straightforward diﬀerentiation, we have
 ˜A1  0 () D1uB( ˜)  0
=) D1uB( ˜) < 0
and
 ˜B1 > 0 () D1uB( ˜)   0
=) D1uA( ˜) > 0
So we must find two cut-points. First,      ⇤⇤ needs to imply A never invests, i.e. D1uA( ˜)  0
when  ˜B1 = 0. By the implication above, B will have no incentive to invest. Second,   <  ⇤ needs
to imply B invests some positive share, i.e. D1uB( ˜)  0 when  ˜A1 > 0. But then D1uB( ˜)  0
implies D1uA( ˜) > 0, which can only happen when  ˜A1 = RA.
To compute  ⇤⇤, fix  ˜B1 = 0 =  ˜A1 . We have
D1u
A( ˜)  0 ()     ↵ 
A
1 ( 
C
2 R
C +  2)
( C2 R
C +  1 +  2)2
⌘  ⇤⇤
To compute  ⇤, fix  ˜A1 = RA and  ˜A0 . We now have
D1u
B( ˜)  0 ()         (1  ↵) 
B
1 ( 
C
2 R
C +  2)
( A1 R
A +  1 +  C2 R
C +  2)2
⌘  ⇤.
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Finally,  ⇤ <  ⇤⇤ because (1  ↵) B1 < ↵ A1 by assumption.
Using necessary and suﬃcient first order conditions, we can write strategies as follows:
 ˜A1 =
8<:max{xA, RA} if   <  ⇤⇤0 if      ⇤⇤ ,
where
xA =
q
↵
 
 A1
 3
 ( C2 R
C +  2)   A1  ( C2 RC +  2 +  1) 
 A1
 
 
,
and
 ˜B1 =
8<:max{xA, RA} if   <  ⇤0 if      ⇤ ,
where
xB =
q
(1  ↵)   B1  3  ( C2 RC +  2)   B1  ( C2 RC +  2 +  A1 RA 1) 
 B1
 
 
.
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